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Abstract 
In most instances of collective decision-making, it cannot be expected that all persons 
who are entitled to vote will end up doing so. This has led institutional designers, out 
of concerns with the “legitimacy” of decisions, to introduce quorum requirements. A 
prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy 
mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We discuss the results of an 
experiment about the consequences of such quora. We show that quora lead to overall 
decreases in participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged 
electoral boycotts on the part of status quo supporters. 
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1. Introduction 
In most instances of collective decision-making, it cannot be expected that all 
members who are entitled to participate will always do so. There may even be 
instances where most members of a legislature, a city council, a club, a board of 
directors, or an electorate fail to show up when a decision is being made. This fact, 
together with concerns about the “legitimacy” and the “representativeness” of 
decisions, often results in the adoption of quorum rules. Examples of such rules can 
be found in the standing orders of legislatures (Rasch 1995; Squire 2006), corporate 
bylaws regulating boards of directors or shareholders meetings (Williams 2006), or 
statutes and constitutional laws regulating direct democracy mechanisms (Kaufmann 
et al. 2008).  
The case of quora as applied to referenda and initiatives motivates particular interest. 
Direct democracy has become almost omnipresent in the US, with more than two-
thirds of Americans living in areas where they can vote in referenda or initiatives 
(Matsusaka 2005). In fact, the use of direct democracy mechanisms has also grown 
dramatically all over the world (Altman 2011). Avowed concerns with distortions 
resulting from very low levels of turnout have led to the introduction of quorum rules 
in direct democracy (LeDuc 2003: 172; Qvortrup 2005: 173). Instead of allowing 
measures to pass if they simply obtain the support of the majority of those who vote, 
participation quora require that the total number of votes (either for or against the 
proposal) exceeds a particular threshold. In other cases, the required threshold is 
applied to the number of votes cast in favor of the proposal (approval quora). In 
several American states, the passage of initiatives involves participation quora, while 
Wyoming employs an approval quorum. Quora also exist in many national, state, and 
local referenda or initiatives in Europe (Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães 2010a; 
Schiller 2011) and elsewhere (Qvortrup 2005; International IDEA 2008). As stated by 
the Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters, in its “Code of Good 
Practice on Referenda” — Venice Comission (2007) —, quorum rules are a crucial 
aspect of the referenda design. 
What are the actual consequences of quora? The issue has been the object of several 
theoretical studies. A first question concerns the consequences of participation quora. 
Côrte-Real and Pereira (2004) examine binary-choice voting rules and find that the 
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addition of a turnout condition such as a participation quorum encourages abstention, 
allowing Status Quo supporters to manipulate the outcome by failing to turn out. 
Similarly, Hizen and Shinmyo (2011) find that participation quorums create 
incentives for strategic abstention when the participation quorum is anything other 
than negligibly low. From a different perspective, that of a group turnout model, 
Herrera and Mattozzi (2010) argue that participation quora distort the incentives for 
parties and interest groups to mobilize the electorate. While one of the consequences 
is that such quora decrease turnout, another is that, under some conditions, they may 
actually favor Change. 
A second question concerns the consequences of participation quora as compared to 
those of approval quora. Herrera and Mattozzi (2010) argue that their analysis of 
participation quora carries over to approval quora, making them essentially 
equivalent. Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães (2010b) investigate the effects of quora in 
a pivotal voter model. Like Herrera and Mattozzi, they show that approval quora may 
also create incentives for strategic abstention and do not necessarily protect the status 
quo. However, they also show that approval and participation quora may not always 
produce the same results. In a different setup, where they distinguish between staying 
at home, specifically designed to replicate parliamentary situations, and abstaining, 
Laruelle and Valenciano (2011 and 2012) study majority rules coupled with several 
different quorum rules. They argue that the approval quorum is the one with the least 
distortionary effects, no matter what the majority rule is. Finally, Maniquet and 
Morelli (2011), using large Poisson voting games (Myerson 2000), conclude that 
approval quora dominate participation quora, in the sense that the former give the 
incentive for people to vote sincerely, while participation quora promote strategic 
abstention. Therefore, relative to the participation quorum, the approval quorum 
simplifies preferences and information aggregation.  
In contrast, empirical research on the consequences of quora is very scarce. The only 
empirical work we are aware of is Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães (2010a). Using 
data for all referenda held in current European Union countries from 1970 until 2007, 
they conclude that the existence of a participation quorum decreased turnout up to 14 
percentage points, while no effect was observed in the presence of approval quora.  
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While this evidence supports the notion that approval quora are less discouraging for 
turnout in the real world, the use of field data involves a number of drawbacks. For 
example, it could be argued that the type of quorum rule in use may be endogenous. 
Another disadvantage is that we can only observe realized outcomes, and do not know 
the distribution of “actual” preferences. Finally, the outcomes we observe are at the 
aggregate level, and (so far) we have little information about the separate effects of 
quora on supporters and opponents of proposals. Similar concerns have motivated 
previous authors to conduct laboratory experiments to investigate factors affecting 
voter participation (Levine and Palfrey 2007; Duffy and Tavits 2008; Palfrey 2009). 
Our approach builds on prior experiments on voter participation by introducing 
quorum rules into the pivotal voter model first developed by Palfrey and Rosenthal 
(1985). This model assumes that voters care solely about the outcome of the election. 
This implies, among other things, that an individual’s decision to vote is driven by her 
beliefs about the likelihood of casting the decisive vote. Despite the starkness of this  
assumption, the implications and comparative static predictions of the pivotal voter 
model have been supported by experimental evidence (Levine and Palfrey 2007; 
Duffy and Tavits 2008; Palfrey 2009), while field evidence is consistent — at least in 
the margins — with the model’s predictions (Blais 2000). Our study is, to our 
knowledge, the first to test the effects of quorum rules under this framework and in a 
controlled laboratory experiment.
4
  
Our experimental design most closely resembles that of Levine and Palfrey (2007), 
who test the effects of “closeness” and electorate size on turnout in an experimental 
pivotal voter game. The main difference between our setup and theirs is that, in 
addition to implementing different distributions of preferences, we consider three 
different quorum restrictions (no quorum, approval quorum, participation quorum).
5
 
As in other experiments on the pivotal voter model, our setup measures an 
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 Previous papers by Schram and Sonnemans (1996), Morton and Tyran (2011), Battaglini et al. 
(2010), and Groβer and Schram (2006 and 2010) have provided laboratory evidence on strategic 
abstention. 
5
 Another difference between our experiment and that of Levine and Palfrey (2007) is that we introduce 
aggregate uncertainty about the number of persons supporting each of the different options. Although 
this implies and added degree of complexity, we feel that uncertainty about the actual percentages for 
and against the measure under consideration is a realistic feature of most voting situations. 
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individuals’ propensity to vote under different conditions by eliciting her willingness 
to incur costs associated with voting.
6
 
The results confirm that quorum rules have very important consequences for turnout, 
and allow us, furthermore, to determine among which type of voters those 
consequences are stronger and what kind of quorum is more consequential. In 
particular, both approval and participation quora reduce participants’ willingness to 
pay in order to cast a vote. Furthermore, quora have different effects conditional on 
electors’ preferences: while the evidence suggests they may increase the turnout rate 
of measures’ “Supporters” (preference for changing the Status Quo), it clearly shows 
that they strongly decrease the turnout rate of “Opponents” (preference for preserving 
the Status Quo). Finally, although Opponents are demobilized by both types of quora, 
this effect is significantly stronger under participation quora. Quora increase the 
probability that Opponents boycott the election, and do so massively (increasing that 
probability by more than 40 percentage points) in the case of participation quora. 
 
2. The pivotal voter model with quorum requirements. 
We base our experiments on the pivotal voter model of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985. 
In this model,   electors (       ) decide, using majority rule, between two 
options labeled “Change” and “Status Quo.” Prior to voting, each player is randomly 
assigned a preference for one of the two options. The ex-ante probability that an 
individual prefers change is denoted    This probability is known and common to all 
players, while the preference actually assigned to each player is private knowledge.
7
 
We refer to the supporters of a proposal to change the Status Quo as “Supporters” and 
to those who prefer the Status Quo as “Opponents.” After learning her own 
preference, each player decides to either vote or to abstain (as there is no incentive to 
vote for the opposing option, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention only 
to the participation decision.) Each voter faces a cost of voting given by   , where    
is the realization of a uniformly distributed random variable,     [   ]. After votes 
are cast, the outcome is determined depending on the number of votes actually cast. In 
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 Unlike Levine and Palfrey (2007), who estimate the willingness to pay from observed vote choices, 
we use the strategy method to directly elicit each subject’s willingness to pay for casting a vote prior to 
revealing her randomly determined cost of voting. 
7
 As mentioned above, we consider a game involving aggregate uncertainty, as in Borgers (2004) and 
Coate et al (2008). 
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the basic game, the option receiving the larger number of votes is chosen. In the 
games with quora, the Status Quo option wins unless the quorum is met and 
“Change” receives the majority of votes cast. 8 If ‘Yes’ wins the election, Supporters 
obtain a benefit  . Otherwise, Opponents have a benefit of  . An individual voter’s 
utility is equal to the realized benefit minus voting costs incurred.  
Since voting is costly, an individual can derive positive utility from voting only if she 
is pivotal, i.e. if her vote affects the (expected) outcome of the election. To understand 
incentives to participate, it is therefore helpful to consider the conditions under which 
an individual’s vote makes a difference given each of the possible quorum rules. 
Consider Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c. In each figure, we assume an electorate of 9 players 
— the size of the electorate in our experiments. In each figure, every square 
corresponds to a possible combination of votes that the 8 other voters in a given group 
have cast. Black squares represent a situation where the Status Quo will win if the 9
th
 
voter abstains. White squares represent situations in which Change would win, and 
the grey squares situations in which a tie would result. The pairs of numbers inside 
each square show the impact of the 9
th
 voter’s decision to vote. The first number is the 
change in the probability of a Status Quo victory for a Opponents, while the second 
number is the change in the probability of a Change victory for a Supporter. 
In Figure 1a, without quorum rules, assume that an elector i believes that without her 
vote the result will be 1 vote for the Status Quo and 2 for Change — (1,2). The pair 
[0.5;0] in the respective square means that, if individual i is an Opponent and decides 
to vote, the probability that the Status Quo prevails increases by 0.5, as her 
participation would guarantee a (2,2) tie. Conversely, if she is a Supporter, her vote 
will change the result from (1,2) to (1,3). Hence, her vote would have zero impact on 
the final outcome. 
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 Like Levine and Palfrey (2007), we assume that each option wins with 50% probability in case of a 
tie, provided that the quorum is met.   
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Figure 1: Set of voting outcomes. Each square represents a combination between votes for Status Quo 
(horizontal axis) and for Change (vertical axis). Black squares represent a Status Quo victory, white squares a 
Change victory, and the grey squares a 50% chance for either side. Pairs of numbers inside squares show the 
impact of the decision of whether to vote or not, reflecting the point of view of a given subject. The first 
number is the change in the probability of a Status Quo victory for an Opponent, while the second number is 
the change in the probability of a Change victory for a Supporter. 
Looking at Figure 1b (participation quorum of 4), we can see that a supporter of 
Change is pivotal if her vote is necessary either to reach the majority of the votes or to 
meet the quorum. Again, in the particular case where an elector believes that the 
result will be (1,2), the pair of numbers inside the respective square is [-0.5, 1]. This 
means that a Supporter is pivotal, as her vote assures that the quorum is met, 
increasing the probability that the Status Quo is reversed by 1. However, for an 
Opponent, voting in this case will foster an undesirable outcome: instead of a victory 
for the Status Quo, obtained through the application of the quorum rule, a 
Opponents’s participation will guarantee that the quorum is met, that the result is a 
9
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tie, and, thus, that the probability of a Status Quo victory actually decreases by 0.5: 
hence the negative numbers in cells (1,2) and (0,3). In other words, an Opponent may 
cast the decisive vote in two conflicting ways. She may be pivotal, in a desirable way, 
if her vote is necessary to reach majority for the Status Quo, but she may pivotal too 
to meet the quorum, in this case fostering the undesirable outcome of ‘Change’. 
Under participation quora, Opponents may actually hurt themselves by voting. 
Consider now Figure 1c, with an approval quorum of 3. The Status Quo region also 
increases in comparison with Figure 1a because it prevails whenever the number of 
votes for Change is less than 3. However, there is also a qualitative change on the 
probability of being pivotal. For an Opponent who believes that without her vote the 
outcome of the election will be (1,2), the impact of voting is zero: with or without her 
vote, the quorum is not met and the Status Quo prevails anyway. For a supporter of 
Change, the ‘Yes’ is decisive to reach the quorum, by moving the result from (1,2) to 
(1,3), creating incentives to vote that would not be there in the absence of quora. 
Hence, the pair [0;1]. Under approval quora, Supporters have an additional incentive 
to vote because there are two potential benefits (meeting the quorum and getting a 
majority) when in the absence of a quorum there is only one.
9
 
A strategy for elector   is a function that specifies whether she votes or abstains for 
each possible realization of the idiosyncratic voting cost   . We look for symmetric 
Bayesian-Nash equilibria. It can be shown that in any such equilibrium, all voters use 
cutoff strategies according to which they vote if and only if their individual voting 
cost is below a given threshold value. Let    and    be the cut-off values for 
supporters of change and opponents, respectively. 
The basic pivotal voter model (without quorum rules) makes a number of interesting 
predictions about the level of turnout, as measured by the expected level of 
participation given the equilibrium cutoff strategies. One of these is the so-called 
competition effect: the “closer” the race (as measured by the difference in the number 
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 As we have seen, Figures 1b and 1c introduce, respectively, a participation quorum of 4 and an 
approval quorum of 3. From the picture, it should be clear that the introduction of a quorum has two 
effects: it changes the incentives structure, and increases the number of possible results that favor the 
status quo. Thus there are two factors potentially affecting outcomes in our different experimental 
treatments. The particular quorum thresholds chosen (AQ=3 and PQ=4) minimize the difference in the 
size of the status quo region (the number of voting outcomes favoring the status quo), allowing us to 
focus on the effect of the different incentives. This choice is discussed in more detail in the section 
where we describe our experimental design. 
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of supporters and opponents), the higher the turnout. Another is the size effect: the 
larger the electorate, the lower the turnout. Finally there is an underdog effect: turnout 
will be higher among supporters of the option with the smallest probability of 
winning.  
Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães (2010b) showed that in the presence of quora, 
multiple equilibria arise. In particular, there will always be a no show equilibrium, as 
a participation rate far below the quorum requirement destroys the individual 
incentive to participate. A second type of equilibrium involves zero turnout among 
Opponents, but positive turnout among Supporters. In such equilibria, Supporters 
have an incentive to vote in order to meet the quorum. Finally, equilibria with positive 
turnout for both Supporters and Opponents are possible. Generally, these equilibria 
are either identical to the no quorum equilibrium or involve some lower participation 
rates among Opponents.  
Within the experiment, we set the group size to    . As Levine and Palfrey (2007), 
we consider symmetric benefits:    .10 We set         and      .11 The 
probability    was varied in order to implement two “close” and two “landslide” 
conditions. Specifically, we implement the following four conditions. 
1. (Landslide majority for Change)      : In this case, the expected group sizes 
are  (                       )  (   ). 
2. (Close majority for Change) 
         (                      )  (   ) 
3. (Close majority for Status Quo) 
        (                       )  (   ). 
4. (Landslide majority for Status Quo) 
        (                       )  (   ) 
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 When calibrating the parameter values for      and  , the particular values are irrelevant, the ratios 
    and     are what really matters. 
11
 These values were chosen because they imply, according to the no-quorum equilibrium predictions, 
relatively high turnout rates in the absence of a quorum. By choosing a high turnout equilibrium to start 
with, we are giving a chance that the quorum is not a binding constraint and that they do not distort 
incentives. Had we started with low turnout rates in the no-quorum case, then quorum busting 
strategies would be very easy to implement and became the only equilibria (see the first scenario in 
Table 1). In such case, it would not be surprising to conclude that quora had deleterious effects. 
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Finally, we consider a participation quorum of 4, and an approval quorum of 3.
12
  
Equilibrium predictions for these conditions are derived in the Appendix. The 
willingness to pay associated with each of the Nash equilibria under each of the above 
scenarios are presented in Table 1. As the voting cost is uniformly distributed 
between 0 and 100, these numbers can be interpreted as individual probabilities of 
casting a vote. Despite the multiplicity of equilibria, a number of general patterns can 
be discerned from Table 1. 
First, we see that the presence of quora is compatible with very low equilibrium levels 
of turnout, either through zero turnout or through equilibria where Supporters and 
(especially) Opponents have a much diminished propensity to vote. Second, other 
equilibria suggest the possibility of an increased participation rate for Supporters, but 
never at a rate that compensates for the demobilization of Opponents. Thus, we have 
the following theoretical prediction: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Both types of quora should reduce overall participation rates 
through a large or very large demobilization effect among Opponents.  
Next, we expect  
HYPOTHESIS 2: The demobilizing effect among Opponents is stronger with a 
participation quorum than with an approval quorum.  
Note that hypothesis 2 is not immediately obvious in Table 1, but it should be obvious 
from Figure 1. In the case of an approval quorum, an Opponent voting or not has no 
influence on meeting the quorum: the incentive to abstain is just a consequence of the 
voting cost. Under a participation quorum, an Opponent may be hurting herself by 
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 As explained earlier, given that quorum rules changes both the incentive structures and the Status 
Quo region in Figure 1, we want to make the latter as similar as possible between quora in order to 
concentrate on the effects of the incentive structure. Choosing      and      accomplishes that. 
With 9 electors, there are 55 possible results. Of these, there are only two possible results that have 
different outcomes. If the Status Quo receives 0 vote and Change receives 3, then, with     , 
Change wins and with      Status Quo wins. The other result is a 2-2. In that case, with     , 
Status Quo wins, while with     , Status Quo wins only with 50% chances. Except for the trivial 
case of      and     , in which the two quora are equivalent, the difference between the two 
Status Quo regions is minimized for these particular choices. For example, had we considered an 
AQ=2 and the status quo region would be a strict subset of the status quo region with PQ=4, meaning 
that the approval quorum threshold would undoubtedly be less restrictive than the participation quorum 
threshold. On the other hand, had we considered AQ=4, and the opposite would happen, with the 
approval quorum status quo region being a strict superset of the status quo region in the participation 
quorum case. 
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helping Change to reach the required quorum. The negative numbers in some of the 
squares of Figure 1b, which are absent in Figure 1c, reflect just this. 
Finally, note that in several of the equilibria with quora, Supporters display a high 
willingness to pay. Therefore, it is possible that 
HYPOTHESIS 3: While, on average, participation rates are lower in the presence of 
quorum requirements, specifically for Supporters, the turnout rate will be higher. 
Table 1: Willingness to pay for different quorum rules, group sizes odds and different profiles 
 
 
3. Experimental design 
The experiment follows a 3 x 4 design to investigate outcomes under the three 
quorum conditions within each of the 4 preference scenarios. More specifically, we 
conducted two different between subject treatments: a participation quorum of 4, and 
an approval quorum of 3. Within each of these treatments, we conduct an additional 
within-subject treatment comparing each of the quorum rules with a no quorum 
Opponents Supporters Average Opponents Supporters Average
No quorum eq1 88 70 76 No quorum eq1 88 82 85
eq1 0 87 58 eq1 87 82 85
eq2 0 12 8 eq2 33 86 62
eq3 0 0 0 eq3 0 100 56
eq1 0 73 49 eq4 0 17 9
eq2 0 1 1 eq5 0 0 0
eq3 0 0 0 eq1 85 78 81
eq2 30 82 59
eq3 0 84 47
eq4 0 2 1
eq5 0 0 0
Opponents Supporters Average Opponents Supporters Average
No quorum eq1 82 88 85 No quorum eq1 69.9 87.5 75.8
eq1 82 89 85 eq1 69.8 91.2 76.9
eq2 24 100 58 eq2 21.3 100.0 47.5
eq3 0 100 44 eq3 0.0 100.0 33.3
eq4 0 25 11 eq4 0.0 40.9 13.6
eq5 0 0 0 eq5 0.0 0.0 0.0
eq1 77 82 79 eq1 60.4 87.0 69.2
eq2 17 98 53 eq2 16.7 100.0 44.5
eq3 0 99 44 eq3 0.0 100.0 33.3
eq4 0 3 1 eq4 0.0 6.1 2.0
eq5 0 0 0 eq5 0.0 0.0 0.0
n = 9, probability of being for change 6/9, participation quorum=4, 
approval quorum=3
n = 9, probability of being for change 5/9, participation quorum=4, 
approval quorum=3
n = 9, probability of being for change 4/9, participation quorum=4, 
approval quorum=3
n = 9, probability of being for change 3/9, participation quorum=4, 
approval quorum=3
Participation 
Quorum
Approval 
Quorum
Participation 
Quorum
Approval 
Quorum
Participation 
Quorum
Approval 
Quorum
Participation 
Quorum
Approval 
Quorum
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baseline condition. Finally, within each of these 3 conditions, we vary the probability 
that an individual voter is a supporter of Change to implement the four preference 
scenarios (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Treatment conditions 
Between-
Subject 
Participation quorum ↔ Approval quorum 
Within-
subject 
SQ landslide 
favorite 
↔ 
SQ close 
favorite 
↔ 
Change close 
favorite 
↔ 
Change landslide 
favorite 
No quorum ↔ Quorum 
 
The experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory of the Alfred Weber 
Institute at the University of Heidelberg, Germany. It involved 144 subjects, all of 
whom were students of the University of Heidelberg.
13
 We conducted a total of 8 
sessions involving 18 subjects per session. Within each session, subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of two groups of size 9. These groups remained fixed 
throughout the experiment, which lasted for 48 rounds.
14
 Payoffs in the game were 
expressed as “points,” with each point corresponding to 5 cents. 
At the start of each round, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two teams, 
labeled “A” and “B.” Although neutrally labeled, one of these options represented the 
“Status Quo” while the other represented “Change.” Next, subjects were informed 
about the existence of the quorum rule (if any), and asked to state a willingness to pay 
(WTP), between 0 and 100 points (€5), to cast a vote in favor of their team. Each 
subject was then randomly assigned a ‘voting cost’ (VC) uniformly distributed 
between 0 and 100 points. If the VC was smaller than or equal to the WTP, the 
subject was said to cast a vote, and the randomly determined VC was subtracted from 
their earnings in the game. If the VC exceeded the WTP, the subject was said to 
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 Subjects were recruited using the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The experiment 
was programmed using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Students came from various 
disciplines (approximately 45% economics, 20% other social sciences, 10% natural sciences, 25% 
humanities). 45% of our subjects were female. 
14
 Subjects were not explicitly informed that they would repeatedly interact with the same set of 
participants. It is important to note that despite this “fixed matching” scheme, subjects were randomly 
assigned to the two “teams” at the beginning of each round. 
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abstain and no cost was subtracted.
15
 After all subjects submitted their decisions, the 
votes actually cast were counted and the winning option determined as per the 
quorum rule in effect. Subjects belonging to the winning team earned 600 points 
(€30). At the end of the experiment, participants were paid the average of 10 
randomly chosen rounds, in addition to a €5 show up fee.16 On average, each 
participant received €21. 
Within an experimental session, the probability of favoring Change varied over the 
course of 48 independent elections (experimental rounds), implementing the four 
different within-subject treatment conditions. To restate: a landslide majority for the 
Status Quo (6/3); a close majority for the Status Quo (5/4); a close majority for 
Change (4/5); and a landslide majority for Change (3/6). The quorum rule also varied, 
from round to round, between no quorum (NQ) and either an approval quorum of 3 
(AQ) or a participation quorum of 4 (PQ), permitting within-subject comparisons 
between NQ and either AQ or PQ, as well as between-subject comparisons between 
AQ and PQ. Note that, in the case of no quorum, the game is perfectly symmetric and, 
therefore, there is no distinction between the “Status Quo” and “Change.” Thus, 
overall, we have          treatment conditions. 
 
4. Experimental results 
4.1 Regression analysis 
We start our analysis by using all the information on all individual actions of the 
experimental subjects, with the exception of the first 12 rounds, which we disregarded 
in order to be more confident that the results reflect participants’ fuller understanding 
the rules of the game. We estimate a regression model where WTP (“willingness to 
pay”) is the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are dummies for the 
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 A potential drawback of this (strategy) method is that it forces participants to use a cutoff strategy, as 
predicted by theory. If our goal was to test this aspect of the theory, this would be an inappropriate 
design choice. However, our aim is to investigate the effects of the quorum rules on participation, and 
not to test the use of cutoff strategies. Still it is important to note that Levine and Palfrey do find that 
“to a reasonable approximation individuals followed consistent cutpoint rules” (2007: 152). Therefore 
we are confident that forcing subjects to use cutoff strategies did not restrict their behavior 
significantly. See Brandts and Charness (2011) for a more general discussion of the strategy method 
and how it compares to the direct response method. 
16
 This method of payment was chosen as a good compromise between avoiding paying all rounds 
(introducing wealth effects) and paying only one round (introducing additional risk). See Morton and 
Wiliams (2010: 399) for a discussion of this methodological choice.  
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combinations between the different quorum treatments and the values of   and, for 
the quorum conditions, whether subjects are Opponents or Supporters. We controlled 
for individual random effects and for the round number — which is like a time trend 
with each period corresponding to a round in the game.
17
 The time trend was 
ultimately removed because its coefficient was not statistically significant and the 
main results were unchanged. 
Table 3: Random effects model of the Willingness To Pay to vote 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
Wald test  
q=nq 
Wald test  
aq=nq 
1- Constant 25.61 2.62   
2- AQ, Opponent, clear minority -5.21 3.42 ns 
*** 
3- PQ, Opponent, clear minority -23.00 3.63 *** 
4- AQ, Supporter, clear minority 5.00 4.74 ns 
ns 
5- PQ, Supporter, clear minority 15.10 4.47 *** 
6- No Quorum, borderline minority 22.95 2.45   
7- AQ, Opponent, borderline minority 11.87 4.51 *** 
*** 
8- PQ, Opponent, borderline minority -11.27 3.84 *** 
9- AQ, Supporter, borderline minority 23.23 3.77 ns 
ns 
10- PQ, Supporter, borderline minority 30.39 3.54 ** 
11- No Quorum, borderline majority 38.26 3.34   
12- AQ, Opponent, borderline majority 14.24 4.83 *** 
*** 
13- PQ, Opponent, borderline majority -2.55 4.31 *** 
14- AQ, Supporter, borderline majority 40.72 3.51 ns 
ns 
15- PQ, Supporter, borderline majority 40.37 3.58 ns 
16- No Quorum, clear majority 36.84 3.30   
17- AQ, Opponent, clear majority 12.69 4.67 *** 
*** 
18- PQ, Opponent, clear majority -2.74 4.21 *** 
19- AQ, Supporter, clear majority 44.53 3.83 *** 
ns 
20- PQ, Supporter, clear majority 44.53 3.68 *** 
 
R-squared 0.29  
 Total observations 5183  
PCSE standard errors & covariance (standard errors clustered by individuals) 
***, **, * = null rejected at 1%, 5% and 10%; ns = null not rejected at 10%. 
 
Table 3 shows the estimation results. The constant corresponds to the treatment of 
Clear Minority under No Quorum. In the second to the last column, we include the 
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 Considering a model with individual fixed effects yields almost identical results, showing that any 
individual and group effects are very well controlled for, with the random effects model. This is not a 
surprise, as the laboratory provides precisely the setup in which the error term and the explanatory 
variables are independent, with all regressors being, by their own nature, purely exogenous. 
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result of Wald test for the null that the quorum treatment has no effect. In the last 
column we perform the same test for the difference between the participation quorum 
and the approval quorum. 
  
 
Figure 2: Experimental results. (a) The ‘willingness to pay’ (WTP) without quorum (NQ) and for Opponents and 
Supporters under the participation quorum (PQ). (b) WTP without quorum (NQ) and for Opponents and 
Supporters under the approval quorum (AQ). (c) The effects of quora for Opponents in comparison with the no 
quorum situation.  Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 2 displays the results graphically. Figure 2a show the estimated WTP — i.e. 
the probability of voting, as voting costs are drawn from a (0,100) uniform 
distribution — both for the no quorum situation and for Supporters and Opponents 
under the participation quorum, depending on the (increasing) probability that each 
other member of the electorate belongs to the their team, from a clear majority against 
(3/6) to a clear majority in support (6/3). Figure 2b shows the same, but this time 
replacing the participation quorum with the approval quorum condition. Finally, 
NQ 
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Figure 2c focuses on the effects of quora for Opponents in comparison with the No 
quorum situation. 
Overall, as Figures 2a and 2b show, under all quorum conditions, WTP was lowest 
when subjects expected to be a clear minority, increasing when the election was 
expected to be close. This is consistent with the predictions of the basic pivotal voter 
model. However, we can also see that quorum rules also affect the propensity to vote, 
and in different ways depending on whether subjects are Opponents or Supporters. 
The results in Table 3 show that Opponents are less likely to vote in the presence of 
quorum rules than in their absence, a decrease that is statistically significant at 1% 
(Table 3, third column) in seven out of eight treatments. With the exception of the 
condition where Opponents expected to be a clear minority under an Approval 
quorum, the negative marginal effects of quora, seen in Figure 2c, were significant 
and large, ranging from -11.1 to -40.8 points. 
In contrast, for Supporters, there is evidence of an increase in the turnout rates in 
comparison with the No quorum situation. As Table 3 shows, that evidence is most 
compelling under the participation quorum and when Supporters expect to be a clear 
majority. In sum, quora affect Opponents and Supporters in different ways: there is 
strong and unambiguous evidence that that they decrease the turnout of those who 
oppose the measure changing the Status Quo, and some evidence that it increases 
Supporters’ turnout. Furthermore, as Figures 2a) and 2b) clearly suggest, the 
increased WTP for Supporters only partially offsets the decrease among Opponents. 
The result that quora decrease overall turnout: overall participation ended up being 
highest in the No Quorum condition (53.8, ± 4.0, 95% CI), lowest under the 
Participation Quorum condition (39.9, ± 4.1, 95% CI), and intermediate under the 
Approval Quorum condition (47.0, ± 4.5, 95% CI). 
If quora affect turnout, which type of quorum has the largest effects? In Table 3, last 
column, we test the difference between the effects of participation and approval quora 
on turnout. For Supporters, the results are not definitive, with the differences not 
being statistically significant at conventional levels. However, for Opponents, the 
demobilizing effect is always significantly stronger in the case of the participation 
quorum. These differences in effect size are always significant at 1% and reach at 
least 14 percentage points. The same is visible in Figure 2c), showing demobilization 
 17 
effects of the participation quorum that are always larger than under approval quora 
and under all values of    
4.2 Non-Parametric Analysis 
The previous analysis can be complemented by looking at non-parametric tests for the 
average willingness to pay. As we explained before, eight groups were subjected to 
the “No quorum” and “Approval quorum” treatments and another eight groups were 
subjected to the “No quorum” and “Participation quorum” treatments. So, to compare 
effects of a quorum treatment with a no quorum treatment, we rely on within-subject 
test, to be more precise we use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (we use the          
function of Matlab). To compare the two different quorum types, we rely on the 
Mann-Whitney U test for independent samples, because in this case we have eight 
groups that are subject to the “Approval quorum” treatment and eight other groups 
that are subject to the “Participation quorum” treatment, (we use the         
function of Matlab). Table 4 shows the results. 
In the first column, just for reference, we have the average willingness to pay that 
corresponds to each treatment. In the second column, we present the p-value of the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null that means are equal under quorum and no 
quorum. Finally, in the third column, we show the p-value associated with the Mann-
Whitney U test, for the null that the means are the same for both quorum types. The 
results basically confirm the results we obtained in Table 3, when we compare the 
quorum with no quorum situation. However, when one compares the effects of the 
two different quorum rules, most of the differences are no longer statistically 
significant. The fact that these differences are so strongly significant in Table 3, 
suggests that not controlling for group effects may have severe consequences. 
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Table 4: Non parametric analysis 
 
Average 
Willingness to 
Pay 
Wilcoxon test  
(p-value)  
Mann-Whitney  
U test 
(p-value) 
1- No Quorum, clear minority 24.4 ; 25.6 
a
   
2- AQ, Opponent, clear minority 15.5 0.078 
0.152 
3- PQ, Opponent, clear minority 8.3 0.008 
4- AQ, Supporter, clear minority 28.9 0.25 
0.105 
5- PQ, Supporter, clear minority 43.8 0.016 
6- No Quorum, borderline minority 47.9 ; 50.7 a   
7- AQ, Opponent, borderline minority 35.6 0.078 
0.049 
8- PQ, Opponent, borderline minority 18.0 0.008 
9- AQ, Supporter, borderline minority 45.5 0.383 
0.328 
10- PQ, Supporter, borderline minority 56.6 0.109 
11- No Quorum, borderline majority 60.9 ; 65.5 a   
12- AQ, Opponent, borderline majority 39.3 0.008 
0.279 
13- PQ, Opponent, borderline majority 26.5 0.008 
14- AQ, Supporter, borderline majority 64.3 0.195 
0.574 
15- PQ, Supporter, borderline majority 66.7 0.461 
16- No Quorum, clear majority 59.1 ; 66.4 a   
17- AQ, Opponent, clear majority 36.2 0.008 
0.195 
18- PQ, Opponent, clear majority 24.4 0.008 
19- AQ, Supporter, clear majority 69.6 0.008 
1.000 
20- PQ, Supporter, clear majority 70.3 0.109 
a
 The first value corresponds to the mean of the ‘no quorum’ treatment in the groups that also played the 
approval quorum. The second value corresponds to the mean in the groups that played the ‘participation 
quorum’ game. 
 
4.3 Quorum-busting strategies 
Discussing the effects of quorum rules, particularly in what concerns referenda and 
initiatives, leads us almost inevitably to discussing the possibility of boycotts, i.e. 
electors who decide to abstain with the firm objective of helping the quorum not to be 
met. Such outcome has been described in historical reports of full-fledged boycotts of 
direct democracy initiatives on the part of supporters of the Status Quo under 
participation quora, including the cases of Italian abrogative referenda (Uleri 2002; 
Kaufmann et al. 2008), the two referenda held under the German Weimar Republic 
(West 1985; Suksi 2002), and several other cases (International IDEA 2008). 
In our setup, that basically corresponds to choosing a willingness to pay equal to zero. 
To describe the impact of the quorum restrictions on the probability of boycotting an 
election in our experimental setup, we created a dummy variable, call it Boycott, that 
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takes the value 1 if WTP=0 and zero otherwise. Then, we estimate a binary choice 
model, with the help of a random effects probit model. We also included a time trend, 
i.e., the round number. 
Table 5: Random effects Probit on boycotting elections 
 
Table 5 shows our results and Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration of the most 
significant findings. As before, the data includes every individual observation, except 
the data corresponding to the first 12 rounds. In the first two columns, we have the 
typical information: information on the estimated coefficients and standard errors for 
the different treatments. In the third column, we convert that information into the 
probability of boycotting and, in the last two columns, we show the marginal effects. 
By marginal effects we mean the impact on the probability of boycotting an election 
from changing from “no quorum treatment” to a “quorum treatment” (in the second to 
Marginal effects Marginal effects
Quorum vs NQ PQ vs AQ
1- Constant -0.974 0.178 24.5
2- AQ, conservative, clear minority 0.466 0.181 41.2 16.6**
3- PQ, conservative, clear minority 1.674 0.189 83.8 59.2***
4- AQ, changer, clear minority -0.229 0.186 17.9 -6.6
5- PQ, changer, clear minority -0.227 0.181 18.0 -6.6
6- No Quorum, borderline minority -1.012 0.137 4.5
7- AQ, conservative, borderline -0.059 0.162 22.7 18.3***
8- PQ, conservative, borderline 1.322 0.164 73.7 69.2***
9- AQ, changer, borderline minority -1.096 0.166 3.7 -0.7
10- PQ, changer, borderline minority -0.920 0.162 5.4 0.9
11- No Quorum, borderline majority -1.789 0.155 0.7
12- AQ, conservative, borderline -0.076 0.158 22.2 21.6***
13- PQ, conservative, borderline 0.967 0.157 60.9 60.3***
14- AQ, changer,borderline majority -1.653 0.184 1.0 0.3
15- PQ, changer, borderline majority -1.343 0.171 2.1 1.4*
16- No Quorum, clear majority -1.291 0.131 2.4
17- AQ, conservative, clear majority 0.020 0.141 25.2 22.8***
18- PQ, conservative, clear majority 0.926 0.140 59.4 57***
19- AQ, changer, clear majority -1.555 0.175 1.2 -1.1
20- PQ, changer, clear majority -1.696 0.187 0.9 -1.5**
Round 0.009 0.003
5183
***, **, * = null rejected at 1%, 5% and 10%
34.2***
-0.4
Std. 
Error
Standard Errors clustered by individuals
42.6***
0
50.9***
1.7
38.7***
1.2
Total observations
Probability 
of Boycott
Coefficient
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the last column), and on the probability of boycotting an election from changing an 
“approval quorum treatment” to a “participation quorum treatment” (last column).18 
While neither quorum significantly impacts the probability that a Supporter boycotts, 
both make it significantly more likely that an Opponent does so. For every treatment, 
the likelihood of Opponents boycotting an election increases significantly.  
The approval quorum raises this probability by a value between 16 and 23 percentage 
points. With one exception, the differences in the impacts of the different quorum 
rules are statistically significant at 1%. The exception is when an Opponent expects to 
be in clear minority. In that case, the marginal effect is significant only at 5%. 
 
  
Figure 3: Experimental results. (a) The probability that an elector boycotts the election without quorum (NQ) 
and, for Opponents, the participation quorum (PQ) and the participation quorum (AQ). (b) The marginal 
effects of quora for Opponents in comparison with the no quorum situation. Error bars denote 95% confidence 
intervals. 
The impact of the participation quorum is dramatically stronger: the increase is at 
least of 57 percentage points and can reach almost 70 points. The marginal effect on 
the probability that an Opponent boycotts an election is always significant at 1%, both 
when compared with the no quorum and with the approval quorum treatments. 
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 To compute the probability of boycott and the marginal effects, we considered Round=30.5 (the 
mean value). 
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5. Conclusions 
Several studies have examined the consequences of institutional rules regulating 
direct democracy, including variables such as “institutional openness” and agenda-
setting rules, on aspects such as the frequency with which referendums or initiatives 
take place, the amount of policy change, and the congruence of policy with citizen 
preferences (Hug and Tsebelis 2002; Hug 2004; Eder at al. 2009). However, studies 
of the determinants of turnout in direct democracy settings are rare, tend to focus on 
aspects such as the closeness of the election or the consequences of ballot issues, and 
have relied mostly on observational data (Filer and Kenny 1980; Matsusaka 1993; 
Coate and Conlin 2004; Coate et al. 2008). In this paper, motivated by a widespread 
aspect of direct democracy design – the adoption of quorum rules – we examine its 
consequences on turnout using a laboratory experiment. Furthermore, although our 
language is the one of “elections”, quorum rules are also used in a broader variety of 
contexts, and the conclusions may travel to settings where similar rules prevail. 
We found that the main predictions of the pivotal voter model, extended to 
accommodate quorum rules, were confirmed. Overall participation rates were lower 
in the presence of quorums, even if, in some situations, the turnout among Supporters 
of measures changing the Status Quo slightly increased — a finding that was not 
present in previous studies. There is also evidence that the demobilization impact 
caused by quora among those who oppose changing the Status Quo was strongest in 
the case of participation quora. An impressive result, which is in agreement with our 
model predictions, was that the participation quorum increased the probability of 
Opponents boycotting the election by 57 to 70 percentage points. The same sort of 
effect, although not nearly as dramatic, was also present, and highly statistically 
significant, for the approval quorum treatment  
Several potential awkward consequences follow from this. Designed to protect the 
Status Quo, quora stimulate the participation of Supporters and depress that of 
Opponents. In other words, when quora are nevertheless met, they end up having 
favored Change. If, in turn, Opponents engage in boycotts that happen to be 
successful, huge majorities of expressed preferences in favor of Change will 
nevertheless fail to pass it. Furthermore, in real world conditions, full boycotts on the 
part of Opponents, which we showed to be massively increased by participation 
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quora, make the preferences of those who vote (Supporters) common knowledge, 
endangering the secrecy of the vote.
19
 Finally, quora decrease overall levels of 
turnout, potentially affecting, in real world conditions, the perceived “legitimacy” of 
results. 
Future experiments may test the robustness of our results to a number of different 
extensions. One such extension could allow for communication among subjects, while 
keeping voting anonymous. This way, they may coordinate strategies to select a 
particular equilibrium. Another potentially interesting experiment will be to allow for 
negative voting costs, to capture the possibility of expressive voting and the idea of 
voting by civic duty. According to Aguiar-Conraia and Magalhães (2010b) this 
extension may help to further differentiate the approval from the participation 
quorum. Finally, allowing for different intensity in preferences to test the effect of 
quorums on the behavior of active minorities may also lead to relevant results. 
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 Regarding this topic, Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães (2010b, p. 52) cite a woman complaining 
about the lack of anonymity in the 2005 Italian referendum on the abolition of restrictions to in vitro 
fertilization and embryo research in Italy: ‘In Capranica, a town of 6000 people, voting will be 
difficult. The local church organized groups of volunteers to intimidate the town's people to prevent 
them from voting. My town is not unique. There are several municipalities where anonymity does not 
exist. People are controlled, their votes, their actions and whereabouts. The degree of distress, 
especially among women, is enormous.’ In this particular referendum in Italy, the Catholic Church 
called for a boycott. Almost 90% of the voters voted for change, but turnout as only slightly above 25% 
and status quo prevailed. 
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Appendix 1: The mathematics of the pivotal voter model with quorum 
requirements 
Assume that if ‘Yes’ wins the election, Supporters obtain a benefit  . Opponents have 
a benefit of  . Assume also that there are   electors (       ) and that each faces a 
cost of voting given by   , where    is the realization of a uniformly distributed 
random variable,     [     ]  Each voter knows her own costs, but only knows the 
cost distribution of the other voters. Also, each elector knows her own type and 
knows the probability that each other individual elector favors the proposal. A 
strategy is a function that specifies if elector   votes or abstains for each possible 
realization of   . A symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium imply that all members of a 
group follow the same strategy. An elector will vote if the voting cost is below some 
threshold. Let    and    be those cut-off values for supporters of Change and 
opponents, respectively. Taking as given the strategies of the other players, let 
 (     ) be the probability that elector i attaches that among the other electors    
vote ‘No’ and    vote ‘Yes’, i.e. the probability that elector i to the square in Figure 1 
with coordinates (     ).
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Collecting the squares in Figure 1 in which a Supporter is pivotal, one can easily 
compute the expected benefit of voting for a Supporter. She will vote if the expected 
benefit exceeds the cost of voting. In equilibrium, this means that 
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For an Opponent, the expected benefit of voting and the equilibrium conditions are 
given by: 
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 This is an obvious abuse of notation, as ρ(.) depends on the strategies of the other players, which also 
depend on the existing quorum requirement. We refer the reader to Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães 
(2010b) for a rigorous derivation of the model. 
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Note that in the participation quorum case, an Opponent may be pivotal in an 
undesirable way if her vote is decisive to meet the quorum, hence the negative signs 
in the second equation. 
For each quorum treatment, we have two equations and two unknowns. To find the 
equilibria numerically, existence of solutions is not a problem, but there are no 
general uniqueness results. However, given that our problem is only two-dimensional 
and bounded, one can perform a detailed grid search to look for several equilibria. 
Only in the case of no quorum, we found unique equilibria. 
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Appendix 2: Experiment instructions  
The following instructions were displayed (in German) on screen when subjects 
entered the laboratory: 
Instructions 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. If you 
have a question, silently raise your hand. 
General Rules 
 This experiment will last for approximately 90 minutes. During this time, you should not 
leave your place. 
 Please turn off and put away your mobile phone. Starting now, there should be nothing on 
your table. (A drink is permitted.) 
 Please remain quiet during the experiment, and do not speak to other participants. 
 At the end of the experiment, stay at your sear until your number is called. You will then be 
paid and you will sign a receipt. 
 You will receive further instructions after all participants have taken their seats.” 
 
After all subjects had taken their seats, an announcement was made that instructions 
for the experiment would be displayed. Subjects were told that the instructions cover 
six screens and that they would be able to navigate back and forth as often as they 
wished.  The following screens were then displayed in sequence, with “forward” and 
“back” buttons displayed at the bottom of the screen. 
 
Screen 1 
Rounds, Points, Payment 
 You will receive a 5 EUR participation fee for participating. During the experiment, you may 
attain either a higher or lower payment. 
 Your payment will depend on your decisions and those of other participants. 
 The experiment consists of 48 rounds, each of which is independent of the others. In every 
round, you will have the opportunity to earn points. At the end of the experiment, 10 rounds 
will be randomly chosen for payment. 
 Your payment will depend on your average number of points in the randomly chosen rounds. 
Points are exchanged for payment at the ratio 
1 point = 0.05 EUR 
 If you should earn a negative number of points during the experiment, the corresponding 
amount will be subtracted from your show-up fee. However, your payment will be positive in 
all cases. 
 
Screen 2 
What happens during a round? 
 At the start of each round, every participant draws a ball from a (virtual) urn. The ball is 
marked either “A” or “B”. (Additional details regarding the composition of the urn will 
follow below.) 
 After this, you and 8 other participants (i.e. a group of 9 participants) will make a choice. 
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 The members of the group choose between two options “A” and “B” by way of voting. 
(Details regarding the voting rules will follow below.) 
 If the option chosen by your group (“A” or “B”) matches the ball you have drawn (“A” of 
“B”), you will receive 600 points in this round. 
(Remember: 1 point = 0.05 EUR. Thus 600 points = 30 EUR) 
Screen 3 
Details: Urn and Balls 
 Every participant draws a ball from his or her own urn, independently of other participants. 
 The urn contains 9 balls. Some are marked “A”, the others are marked “B”. The composition 
of the urn will vary from one round to the next. 
 You will be informed about the number of balls marked “A” and “B” at the beginning of each 
round. 
 Within a given round, the number of balls “A” and “B” are the same for all participants. The 
chances of drawing a ball marked “A” or a ball marked “B” are therefore the same for all 
participants. 
Example: Suppose that the urn contains 4 balls marked “A” and 5 balls marked “B”. 
 In this example, the probability that you will draw a ball marked “A” is 4/9. The 
probability that you will draw a ball marked “B” is 5/9. The same is true for all other 
participants. 
 In this example, it will not necessarily be the case that 4 participants will draw a ball 
marked “A” and 5 participants will draw a ball marked “B”. For example, it is possible 
(though unlikely) that all participants will draw a ball marked “A”. 
Screen 4 
Details: Voting 
 In each round, every participant will decide whether he wishes to vote or whether he wishes 
not to vote. 
 If the participant chooses to vote, a certain number of points will be subtracted from his total 
in that round. We will refer to the number of points subtracted as his voting cost. 
 Your voting costs lie between 0 and 100 points. They will be randomly determined for 
each participant at the beginning of every round. Every number between 0 and 100 points is 
equally likely. (Remember: 1 point = 0.05 EUR. Therefore 100 points = 5 EUR.) 
 Every participant is assigned his own voting cost in each round. In general, these costs will 
therefore differ between participants. 
 If a participant decides to vote, then a vote for the option corresponding to his ball is 
automatically counted. 
Example: Suppose you draw a ball marked “A”. If you choose to vote, then one vote for 
option “A” is automatically counted. 
Screen 5 
Details: Your Decision 
 In order to better understand your decision (vote or not vote), we will proceed as follows. 
 In each round, we will ask you to state how much you are willing to pay, at most, in order to 
cast a vote in this round. 
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 Important: We will ask this question before we inform you of your actual voting cost in the 
round. (However you will know the composition of the urn, the ball you have drawn, and the 
voting rule that is in effect.) 
 If your voting cost is smaller than or equal to your stated willingness to pay, you will cast a 
vote and “pay” the voting cost (not your stated willingness to pay). 
 If your voting cost is larger than your stated willingness to pay, you will not cast a vote. 
 Your statement has no influence on your actual voting cost. This cost is randomly 
determined already before you make your decision.  
Screen 6 
Details: Voting Rule 
 After all participants have decided (as described above) to vote or not to vote, the votes cast 
are counted. 
 Recall that when a participant votes, a vote for the option corresponding to his ball is 
automatically counted. 
 In principle: The option which receives the most votes is chosen. In case of a tie, a random 
choice is made (50/50). 
 However: In addition, in some rounds, there will be a so-called quorum rule. This rule 
states that one of the two options (A or B) will be automatically chosen if fewer than 4 votes 
are cast [fewer than 3 votes are cast for the other option]. 
Example: Suppose the quorum rule states: “If fewer than 4 votes [3 votes for option B] are cast, 
option A will automatically win.” Then if, for example, 2 votes for option B and one vote for 
option A are cast, option A will win despite that B has a majority of the votes.  
 You will be informed prior to making your decision about whether a quorum rule is in effect, 
and which option will win if the quorum is not met. 
 Note: If the option corresponding to your ball wins, you will receive 600 points, even if you 
have not cast a vote. 
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Screenshot 1: drawing a ball 
 
 
Screenshot 2: Input willingness to pay 
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Screenshot 3: Feedback after cost draw 
 
 
Screenshot 4: Feedback at end of round 
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